THE ADEQUACY OF REMEDIES AGAINST MONOPOLY UNDER STATE LAW
It is well known that the enactment of the Federal Anti-Trust Act of I89 o was largely induced by a prevalent belief that the remedies obtainable under State law against what are commonly known-as "monopolies" or "trusts," were inadequate.
At about the same time, that is in 1889, commenced the era of State anti-trust legislation, in force in so many of the States. It may be conceded that as matters now are, such legislation is, generally speaking, without application to what is strictly commerce or transportation within the scope of the commerce clause, conferring upon Congress what is (though not in terms) the exclusive power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States." ' But this can doubtless be explained as merely an application of the general rule that the exercise of the power of Congress under such provision as here, by the Act of 189o, excludes the exercise of any conflicting power under authority of a State. Other illustrations are legislation by way of regulation of immigration, 2 and the Interstate Commerce Act.
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But it does not follow that State anti-trust legislation would be equally ineffective in the absence of such legislation by Congress, and it should be borne in mind that for nearly twenty years there has been little or no opportunity to test the adequacy of such legislation, with reference to the application of the commerce clause. Now, it is true that the power of Congress under such provision is, even in the absence of exercise thereof, exclusive of any exercise of power of a State to legislate by way of direct regulation of commerce within the scope thereof, 4 at any rate I See for instance: Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 Fed., 242 (C. C. A. 8th regulations preventing the transportation of persons.
10 To the same principle seems referable the imposition of restrictions upon transportation into the State for the purpose of preventing fraud or deception in sales, thus, of oleomargarine."
So as to the transportation of game for the purpose of exercising the "power to preserve a food supply" which belongs in common to all the people of the State.
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Considered by themselves, these decisions seem to have been rendered in analogous cases, and to furnish strong support for the view that the power of a State to enact anti-trust laws includes the power to prohibit or otherwise regulate the transportation of a monopolized article into the State. But it will be objected that this view is contradicted by the well-known decisions with reference to intoxicating liquors and oleomargarine.
Thus Perhaps by the same rule it is within the power of a State to prohibit monopoly in the business of transportation into the State, as incident to its power to prohibit such monopoly of transportation within the State. This view may find support in Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 1 " where was sustained, as applicable to a corporation engaged in interstate transportation, a prohibition against the consolidation of parallel or competing lines.
But if otherwise the power of a State to enact anti-trust laws does not include the power to prohibit transportation into the State, may not the obstacle be removed by Congressional legislation analogous to the Wilson Act of I89O, giving effect to State legislation as to intoxicating liquors "upon arrival in such State ?" This language has, indeed, been narrowed by judicial construction to arrival at the destination within the State, coupled with delivery to the consignee. ' But it may be that the provision would be equally applicable if including arrival at the boundary of the State. In this view, State anti-trust legislation would seem to have reasonably ample scope.
But even if the view just advocated be untenable, and State anti-trust statutes inapplicable to transportation into the State, there yet remains in the States a vast source of power derived from the principle established in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co.,'" that "the principles of the common law are operative upon all interstate commercial transactions except in so far as they are modified by Congressional enactments." Here relief was held properly allowed in a State court against illegal discrimination even in transportation within the scope of the commerce clause. There seems no reason to doubt that the principle is equally applicable to relief against monopoly, so that the commerce clause of itself, in the absence of Congressional legislation thereunder furnishes no objection to the allowance in a State court of relief on common law grounds against transportation into the State under conditions of monopoly.
Whether criminal liability could be enforced by virtue of this principle may not be entirely clear, though the opinion has been frequently expressed that there exists on common law grounds, liability for acts producing or tending to produce restrictions upon competition. 23 It will be recalled that this seems substantially the view advocated by Judge Parker in the presidential campaign of i9o4.
